Washington International Law Journal
Volume 25
Number 3 Asian Courts and the Constitutional
Politics of the Twenty-First Century
6-1-2016

The Politics of Constitutional Common Law in Hong Kong under
Chinese Sovereignty
Eric C. Ip

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric C. Ip, The Politics of Constitutional Common Law in Hong Kong under Chinese Sovereignty, 25 Wash.
Int’l L.J. 565 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol25/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Compilation © 2016 Washington International Law Journal Association

THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
IN HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY
Eric C. Ip †
Abstract:
This article studies how the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
has come to develop a sophisticated judicial gloss on the provisions of the Basic Law,
Hong Kong’s constitutional document, in ways unforeseen by the Chinese National
People’s Congress that enacted it. The ascendancy of constitutional common law in
Hong Kong after the end of British rule is remarkable when considered in light of the
continuing denial of democratic self-rule by China’s authoritarian Party-state. This
article argues that the profusion of political transaction costs due to the fragmentation of
the ruling elite and state-society discord consequent to the resumption of Chinese
sovereignty has created the requisite space for the Court to craft, with impunity,
consequential yet politically realistic doctrines bearing on such weighty matters as
constitutional interpretation, central-local relations, separation of powers, and rights
protection.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Independent and politically consequential judicial review commonly
coincides with the conventional understanding of authoritarianism 1 as
disregarding constitutional limits on rulers’ authority and showing scant
respect for individual rights. 2 Against this backdrop, it seems all the more
remarkable that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has ascended into an
“activist,” 3 “independent,” 4 and “pivotal” 5 “custodian of the constitution,” 6

†
D.Phil. (Oxford); Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong
Kong. Email: ericip@cuhk.edu.hk. The author is grateful to Po Jen Yap for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft. All errors remain the author’s own.
1
See Peter H. Solomon, Courts & Judges in Authoritarian Regimes, 60 WORLD POL. 122, 125–28
(2007).
2
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism, in
CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 165, 166 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert Simpser eds., 2014).
3
Laifan Lin & Mingkang Gu, Can Courts in Hong Kong Examine the Constitutionality of the
Legislative Conduct of the PRC?, in HONG KONG IN TRANSITION: ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS 175, 188
(Robert Ash et al. eds., 2003).
4
Eric C. Ip, The Evolution of Constitutional Adjudication in the Chinese Special Administrative
Regions: Theory and Practice, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 799, 801 (2013).
5
Johannes Chan, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Journey, 1997–2011, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA
IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 169, 179 (Albert H.Y. Chen ed., 2014) [hereinafter Johannes Chan,
Hong Kong’s Constitutional Journey].
6
Albert H.Y. Chen & P.Y. Lo, The Basic Law Jurisprudence of the Court of Final Appeal, in HONG
KONG’S COURT OF FINAL APPEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CHINA’S HONG KONG 352, 390
(Simon N.M. Young & Yash Ghai eds., 2014).
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notwithstanding the continuing denial of democratic self-rule and oversight
by China’s authoritarian Party-state. 7
Since its inception on July 1, 1997, the Court has defied the
“authoritarian” 8 government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) to hold that persons “unlawfully” detained by the police “are
entitled to use reasonable force to free themselves,” 9 and that the executive
has “a positive duty . . . to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
enable lawful assemblies to take place peacefully.” 10 The Court of Final
Appeal has declared a criminal law provision that subjected homosexual
men to unjustified differential treatment on the basis of their sexual
orientation as unconstitutional, 11 recognized the right of postoperative
transsexuals to marry in their new gender, 12 affirmed the right of nonpermanent residents to travel to and return from overseas, 13 invalidated
statutory limits on its own competence to hear parliamentary election
petitions,14 quashed a seven-year residency requirement before new
immigrants may apply for social security payments, 15 and demanded that the
Legislative Council enact corrective covert surveillance legislation within a
specified time limit. 16
It has even designed new procedures for
constitutional adjudication, reviving defunct British Imperial laws as
7

Martin S. Flaherty, Hong Kong Fifteen Years After the Handover: One Country, Which
Direction?, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 276 (2013).
8
There is broad scholarly consensus that the political regime in Hong Kong is an “authoritarian”
one. See, e.g., Matthew Y.H. Wong, Party Models in a Hybrid Regime: Hong Kong 2007–2012, 15 CHINA
REV. 67, 69 (2015) (“Hong Kong is generally considered to be an example of liberal
authoritarianism . . . ”); STAN HOK-WUI WONG, ELECTORAL POLITICS IN POST-1997 HONG
KONG: PROTEST, PATRONAGE, AND THE MEDIA 7–9 (2015); BRIAN C.H. FONG, HONG KONG’S
GOVERNANCE UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY: THE FAILURE OF THE STATE-BUSINESS ALLIANCE AFTER
1997 7 (2014); Tai-lok Lui & Stephen Wing-kai Chiu, Governance Crisis and Changing State-Business
Relations: A Political Economy Perspective, in REPOSITIONING THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT: SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 91, 94 (Stephen Wing-kai Chiu & Siu Lun Wong eds., 2012);
Dexter Boniface & Alon Ilan, Is Hong Kong Democratizing?, 50 ASIAN SURV. 786, 797 (2010) (“Hong
Kong is still far from meeting the procedural minimal definition of democracy: basic standards of
participation, free and fair elections, civil liberties, and autonomy.”). See Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian
Constitutionalism: Some Conceptual Issues, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, supra note 2,
at 36, 36–37, 45–48 (explaining the existence of “authoritarian constitutionalism” and defining
“authoritarianism” as a system in which “all decisions can potentially be made by a single decision maker
whose decisions are both formally and practically unregulated by law.” In sum, an authoritarian regime
need not be one that arrests political opponents arbitrarily or suppresses every criticism of its policies).
9
Yeung May Wan v. H.K., [2005] 8 H.K.C.F.A.R. 137, 139, 160 (C.F.A.).
10
Leung Kwok Hung v. H.K., [2005] 8 H.K.C.F.A.R. 229, 250 (C.F.A.).
11
Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, 336 (C.F.A.).
12
W v. The Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.).
13
Gurung Kesh Bahadur v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 5 H.K.C.F.A.R. 480 (C.F.A.).
14
Mok Charles v. Tam Wai Ho & Another, [2010] 13 H.K.C.F.A.R. 762 (C.F.A.).
15
Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950, 997 (C.F.A.).
16
Koo Sze Yiu v. Chief Executive of H.K., [2006] 9 H.K.C.F.A.R. 441, 472 (C.F.A.).
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additional grounds for judging the validity of acts passed before July 1,
1997, 17 striking down a non-infringing provision to better achieve statutory
ends, 18 and applying remedial interpretation to “read down” constitutionally
defective statutes. 19
Today, those who rely on constitutional law, be they politicians,
judges, lawyers, journalists, or activists, must consult not just the Hong
Kong Basic Law 20 itself, but also the voluminous case law of the Court of
Final Appeal thereon, whether they agree with the Court’s expansive role or
not. 21 The institutional common denominator of these judgments is a fullfledged constitutional common law consisting of a sizeable repertoire of
substantive, procedural, and remedial judicial doctrines that were inspired,
but not strictly required, by the Basic Law. 22 The common law’s gloss on
the Basic Law is now well established. In the extrajudicial words of one of
the Court’s most influential judges, former Chief Justice of Australia Sir
Anthony Mason, “[t]here is an essential unity between the Basic Law and

17

Solic. & Law Soc’y of H.K. v. Sec’y for Justice, [2003] 6 H.K.C.F.A.R. 570 (C.F.A.).
Koon Wing Yee v. Insider Dealing Tribunal, [2008] 11 H.K.C.F.A.R. 170, 173 (C.F.A.).
19
H.K. v. Hung Chan Wa, [2006] 9 H.K.L.R.D. 842, 855, 867–68 (C.F.I.).
20
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA (H.K.) [hereinafter Basic Law] (Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted on April 4, 1990 by the Seventh
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Third Session)).
21
The Court of Final Appeal’s exercise of constitutional judicial review has attracted criticism from
mainland Chinese legal circles. For an excellent review of this literature, see PUI YIN LO, THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: COURTS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY AFTER 1997 185–203
(2014). These critical viewpoints ultimately culminated in a White Paper published by the State Council
Information Office of the People’s Republic of China on June 10, 2014, titled “The Practice of the ‘One
Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” which inter alia asserts,
“Under the policy of ‘one country, two systems,’ all those who administrate Hong Kong, including . . .
judges of the courts at different levels and other judicial personnel, have on their shoulders the
responsibility of correctly understanding and implementing the Basic Law, of safeguarding the country's
sovereignty, security and development interests, and of ensuring the long-term prosperity and stability of
Hong Kong . . . . All this is necessary for displaying sovereignty, ensuring loyalty to the country by the
mainstay of Hong Kong administrators and helping them to subject to oversight by the central government
and Hong Kong society, while taking their responsibility for the country, the HKSAR and Hong Kong's
residents.” See INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE
PRACTICE OF “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” POLICY IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION 46–47 (2014), reprinted in FULL TEXT: CHINESE STATE COUNCIL WHITE PAPER ON “ONE
COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” POLICY IN HONG KONG”, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST EDITION: HONG KONG
(June 10, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-text-practice-one-countrytwo-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
22
See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1975)
(discussing the concept of Constitutional Common Law, which has its roots in American Supreme Court
jurisprudence where the Court often goes beyond mere interpretation of the language of the Constitution).
See also PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA 80–103 (2015) [hereinafter PO
JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE].
18
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the common law that is denied if they are treated as if each occupies a
separate watertight compartment.” 23
The Court of Final Appeal, lacking enforcement or budgetary powers
of its own, 24 can prevail only if political officials refrain from overturning its
rulings, 25 which in turn requires the Court to adopt a pragmatic course of
action. 26 The ascendency of this body of constitutional common law of
“exceptionally high quality” 27 is puzzling in light of the Basic Law’s
undisputed socialist and civil law pedigree 28 and the absence of any
meaningful constitutional adjudication throughout the British era 29—a time
when Hong Kong was governed by a liberal democratic common law
sovereign, and characterized by the persistent impasse over
democratization. 30
How did the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal prevail against all
odds over the past two decades? To address this question, this article
examines the application of the Basic Law within the context of the modern
Hong Kong political climate and the historically authoritarian roots of the
doctrine. Section II outlines the theoretical framework: high political
transaction costs make regimes likelier to acquiesce in assertive claims to
constitutional judicial review powers, which empower courts in turn to
invent doctrines that heighten the cost of overturning those claims. The net
result is to inure the regime to the flowering of constitutional rule of law in
the teeth of its own authoritarianism. Section III outlines the Basic Law’s
oft-overlooked authoritarian character and the web of constraints in which it
might entangle the Court of Final Appeal’s constitutional authority. Section
IV applies the theoretical framework, explaining the durability of
23
Anthony Mason, The Common Law, in HONG KONG’S COURT OF FINAL APPEAL, supra note 6, at
327, 335 (Sir Anthony Mason is one of the Court’s most influential judges and the former Chief Justice of
Australia).
24
See generally JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 444 (2d ed. 2015).
25
Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the Role of Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 273, 274 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds.,
2006).
26
Po Jen Yap, 10 Years of the Basic Law: The Rise, Retreat and Resurgence of Judicial Power in
Hong Kong, 36 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 166, 167 (2007).
27
Yash Ghai, Themes and Arguments, in HONG KONG’S COURT OF FINAL APPEAL, supra note 6, at 1,
13.
28
Pui Yin Lo, Hong Kong: Common Law Courts in China, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 183, 223
(Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2015).
29
KEMAL BOKHARY, HUMAN RIGHTS: SOURCE, CONTENT AND ENFORCEMENT 30 (2015).
30
See Alexei Trochev, Fragmentation? Defection? Legitimacy? Explaining Judicial Roles in PostCommunist “Colored Revolutions,” in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 67, 68 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds., 2013).
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constitutional common law in terms of the broader political context,
highlighting seven of the Court’s core doctrines: the Basic Law’s
supremacy, the living constitution, the separation of powers, legality,
proportionality, the margin of appreciation, and avoidance of judicial
reference. Section V concludes with a summary of its theoretical and
empirical findings, a discussion of how changes in the wider political
context might impact constitutional common law, and how the Court could
defend its review authority.
PERDURABLE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION UNDER
AUTHORITARIANISM

II.

One cannot dismiss the legal basis of every authoritarian government
as a “camouflage constitution.” 31 Such constitutions can leverage rulers to
coordinate oligarchs and to regulate the bureaucracy in meaningful ways. 32
But like all constitutions, authoritarian ones do not execute themselves, for
even the most intelligent autocrat cannot handle every decision by himself. 33
All constitutions must include principal-agent bargain guiding agents, such
as administrative officials and judges, in their implementation.34 Be it ever
so authoritarian, a regime cannot withhold all discretion from courts if a
constitutional text is to be meaningfully implemented. 35 Reliance on judicial
means, in particular, to arbitrate core political controversies “knows no
democratic/authoritarian borders” nowadays. 36 Inevitably, this raises the
possibility of constitutional jurisprudence straying from the authoritarian
regime’s preferences.
The divergence between constitutional text encoding the regime’s
preferences and the jurisprudence of courts will sooner or later incite the
principal to rein in the agent. To achieve this end, the regime may deploy, in
addition to formal amendments of the constitution, less formal means like
impeachment of “rogue” judges, curtailment of jurisdiction, a supermajority
requirement for unconstitutionality rulings, budget slashing, and court
31

JAN-ERIK LANE, CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 119 (1996).
Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in
CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, supra note 2, at 1, 2.
33
Xin He, The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, in CONSTITUTIONS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, supra note 2, at 245, 258–59.
34
TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN
CASES 23 (2003).
35
Martin Shapiro, The Mighty Problem Continues, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 30, at
380, 383–86.
36
RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 248 (2010). See also Tamir Moustafa, Law and
Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 281, 283 (2014).
32
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packing. 37 But the regime must be able to detect judicial malfeasance in the
first place before it can decide and implement a response. Here, the obstacle
of political transaction costs figures prominently. These include the costs of
running the polity, of making decisions, of giving orders, and of monitoring,
measuring, and enforcing compliance. 38 Opposition by citizens, civil
society, and the legal profession to government action that weakens the
court, or court-curbing, is not unique to democracies. 39 Even authoritarian
regimes, to remain secure in their power, must heed public opinion from
time to time. 40 And yet, even “given the fickleness of majorities,” 41 external
resistance in combination with the regime’s internal incohesion can advance
judicial empowerment in the long run.
Genuine separation of powers seldom thrives in authoritarian regimes,
but neither are ruling elites adamantine monoliths. Varying policy agendas
and political visions coexist amongst political elites, 42 as do contrary
evaluations of the utility of judicial power. 43 A regime encumbered by high
internal transaction costs is prone to indecision or “legislative inertia” 44 as to
whether and how to react to controversial judicial decisions. As recent
empirical case studies confirm, 45 chronic internal fragmentation, combined
with potent resistance by media, civil society organizations, and mass
movements, can handicap even an authoritarian government that might
otherwise sanction assertive judicial claims. 46 Insurmountable political
transaction costs are necessary but insufficient for judicial interpretations of
the constitution to be sticky. Courts have to institutionalize their
37
See Todd Schneider, David v. Goliath? The Hong Kong Courts and China’s National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 575, 595 (2002).
38
EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 47 (1997).
39
TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 19 (2007).
40
Sherzod Abdukadirov, The Problem of Political Calculation in Autocracies, 21 CONST. POL.
ECON. 360, 362 (2010).
41
Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth, Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in
Comparative Perspective, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 345, 361–62 (2009).
42
Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics in the Active Voice, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra
note 30, at 363, 369.
43
John Ferejohn, Judicial Power: Getting It and Keeping It, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra
note 30, at 349, 353.
44
PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE, supra note 22, at 85.
45
See, e.g., PAULA NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
(2002); Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina under
Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 291 (2002); MOUSTAFA, supra note 39; ALEXEI
TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA: CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN RUSSIAN POLITICS 1990–2006 (2008); DANIEL
COMPAGNON, A PREDICTABLE TRAGEDY: ROBERT MUGABE AND THE COLLAPSE OF ZIMBABWE (2011).
46
Trochev, supra note 30, at 69.
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constitutional preferences, while their doctrines must accommodate political
reality if they are to stand the test of time. 47 Having few resources to
withstand political backlash, courts that aim to vindicate constitutional
values and rights must anticipate the reactions of weighty regime insiders in
order to avert court-curbing. 48 Judicial doctrines must be strategically
crafted to not only maximize judicial power but also to return substantial
benefits to diverse parties outside and inside the regime in ways that raise
the opportunity and transaction costs to the regime of retaliating.
III.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE BASIC LAW

In December 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, an international
treaty registered with the United Nations, set in motion the transfer of Hong
Kong, which had been ceded by the Qing Emperor to the British Crown in
the nineteenth century, to Communist China by an “almost surgical
exercise.” 49 To shore up eroding domestic and international confidence, the
Joint Declaration provided for the establishment of a highly autonomous
Special Administrative Region under Chinese sovereignty 50 vested with
executive, legislative, and independent judiciary powers 51 and led by a Chief
Executive appointed by Beijing on the basis of locally held elections or
consultations. 52 The contracting parties undertook to preserve the thenBritish dependency’s pre-existing legal,53 social, and economic systems and
life-styles, rights and liberties; 54 status as an international financial centre; 55
separateness of its port and customs; 56 finance and taxation arrangements; 57
and public security forces 58 from those of mainland China. The parties also
sought to maintain Hong Kong’s economic ties with the United Kingdom
and the rest of the world 59 and endow it with power to issue passports and
47
John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263 (1992).
48
John Ferejohn et al., Comparative Judicial Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
POLITICS 727, 744 (Carles Boix & Susan Stokes eds., 2007).
49
Nihal Jayawickrama, Public Law, in THE LAW IN HONG KONG 1969–1989 49, 53 (Raymond
Wacks ed., 1989).
50
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, art. 3(1)-(2), ChinaEng., 1399 U.N.T.S 23391.
51
Id. art. 3(3).
52
Id. art. 3(4).
53
Id. art. 3(3).
54
Id. art. 3(5).
55
Id. art. 3(7).
56
Id. art. 3(6).
57
Id. art. 3(8).
58
Id. art. 3(11).
59
Id. art. 3(9).
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conclude certain agreements with foreign states and international
organizations. 60 In addition to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, all of these
policies were codified into a document called the Basic Law. 61 However,
nothing more than Beijing’s goodwill guaranteed the observance of these
grandiose promises on the part of China after the withdrawal of British rule
on June 30, 1997. As the leading mainland Chinese Basic Law drafter Wu
Jianfan noted, “[The Joint Declaration] says nothing about who decides
whether the laws enacted are in accordance with the Basic Law and legal
procedures or how to handle laws which do not accord with the Basic Law
and legal procedures.” 62
The Basic Law Drafting Committee convened in June 1985 under the
auspices of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. It consisted of fifty-nine
people, most from the mainland and all handpicked by the Chinese
Communist Party and approved by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress. 63 None of the committee members were representatives
of the general public of Hong Kong. 64 The Hong Kong Basic Law was
enacted by the Seventh National People’s Congress and promulgated
without referendum by the President of the People’s Republic of China five
years later, on April 4, 1990. The Basic Law may have purported to
perpetuate the past independence from mainland China, but its actual
provisions fall short of that goal. 65 It reflects Socialist legal and political
assumptions. 66 It was, and is, seen by Beijing as a political manifesto
declaring China’s policy regarding the former British dependency. 67 The
objectives of China’s policies are “national unity,” “territorial integrity,”
“prosperity,” and “stability.” 68 For Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese
leaders, Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability were interrelated with China’s
60

Id. art. 3(10).
Id. art. 3(12).
62
Wu Jianfan, Several Issues Concerning the Relationship between the Central Government of the
People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J. CHINESE L. 65, 75
(1988).
63
CINDY YIK-YI CHU, CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND HONG KONG CAPITALISTS: 1937–1997 71
(2010).
64
Liu Yiu-Chu, Interpretation and Review of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 2 J. CHINESE L. 49, 51 (1988).
65
Eric C. Ip, Mapping Parliamentary Law and Practice in Hong Kong, 3 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 97,
104 (2015).
66
See Ignazio Castellucci, Legal Hybridity in Hong Kong and Macau, 57 MCGILL L.J. 665, 689–93
(2012).
67
Ann D. Jordan, Lost in the Translation: Two Legal Cultures, the Common Law Judiciary and the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 335, 350–52 (1997).
68
Basic Law, supra note 20, preamble; Wang Shuwen, The Basic Rights and Obligations of
Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J. CHINESE L. 123, 136 (1988).
61
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developmental strategy. 69 Proceeding almost naturally from “stability” and
“prosperity” is hostility toward electoral democracy and universal suffrage.
For Beijing, democratization implied the encroachment of “Western”
influence onto Chinese soil, to the detriment of its sovereignty and national
security. 70
Seen in this light, the grant of “a high degree of autonomy” to Hong
Kong can hardly mean genuine self-government. The Chief Executive, the
“linchpin” of the SAR, 71 represents the Chinese state in Hong Kong and the
SAR externally. 72 He is appointed by the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China on the recommendation of a corporatist electoral college
currently comprised of 1,200 members, the vast majority of whom are not
selected by direct elections and are sympathetic to Beijing’s interests. 73
Moreover, the “functional constituencies,” a strategically selected crosssection of Hong Kong society made up of hierarchically organized
professional bodies and dominated by special interests, occupies no less than
half the Legislative Council. No statute enacted by the Legislative Council
is valid until the Chief Executive assents to it. 74 No one may introduce a bill
related to “government policies” without the Chief Executive’s “written
consent,” 75 and indeed, only the Chief Executive himself may introduce bills
related to “public expenditure[s],” the “political structure,” or the “operation
of the government.” 76 The Chief Executive has legal authority to maneuver
in matters not directly affecting China’s national interests. 77
The Basic Law contains no independent enforcement mechanism for
its provisions. Paramount power to interpret the Basic Law is vested in the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 78 making it a “most
powerful and effective tool” for Beijing to intervene in Hong Kong politics

69

KIT POON, THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF HONG KONG: DEMOCRACY WITHIN COMMUNIST CHINA 27–
28 (2008).
70
SONNY SHIU-HING LO, THE DYNAMICS OF BEIJING-HONG KONG RELATIONS: A MODEL FOR
TAIWAN? 134 (2008) [hereinafter SONNY SHIU-HING LO, THE DYNAMICS].
71
Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law and Capitalism: Reflections on the Basic Law, in HONG KONG,
CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 343, 365 n.100 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1993).
72
Basic Law, supra note 20, at art. 43.
73
Li Pang-kwong, The Executive, in CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 27,
29 (Wai-man Lam et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
74
Basic Law, supra note 20, art. 49.
75
Id. art. 74.
76
Id.
77
Steve Tsang, China and Political Reform in Hong Kong, 2 PAC. REV. 68, 72 (1989).
78
Basic Law, supra note 20, art. 158.
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and governance. 79 Nothing, however, obliges Congress or its Standing
Committee, to square any amendments to or interpretations of the Basic Law
with the Joint Declaration. 80 The Chief Executive is expressly charged with
safeguarding the Basic Law, 81 but it is incredible to imagine him enforcing it
against his own government or his political principals in Beijing. Nor does
the Basic Law contain guidance on how to rectify breaches of its provisions
by statutes made by Hong Kong’s autonomous Legislative Council, other
than for the Legislative Council to amend or repeal them. 82 The Standing
Committee may invalidate acts of the Legislative Council if it considers
them contrary to the Basic Law’s provisions on matters wholly or partially
outside the SAR’s autonomy. 83
While Article 158 of the Basic Law mandates the Standing Committee
to “authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to
interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law
which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region,” it does not
clarify whether the SAR courts are entitled to review and strike down
legislation and executive decisions on constitutional grounds. 84 Prominent
Basic Law drafters in fact warned against just that. Liu Yiu-chu argued that
to vest in the Court of Final Appeal “the power of final adjudication over
disputes which concern the ‘constitutionality’ of [SAR] legislation” would
not just be “strange,” but also tantamount to “establishing [the Court’s]
supremacy” over the Hong Kong and Chinese governments “in all matters
covered by the Basic Law.” 85 Wu Jianfan commented that to vest the Court
of Final Appeal with “power to declare a portion of . . . or the entire [Act of
the Legislative Council] invalid” and review “whether laws are in
accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures” might contravene the
Chinese Constitution, which empowers the Standing Committee “to review
local regulations enacted by the organs of state power in the provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central
Government and . . . repeal those local laws and regulations that contravene
79
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69, 78.
80
Basic Law, supra note 20, art. 159(4).
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Id. art. 17(3).
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Central Government and the SAR, in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG’S FUTURE 107, 124 (Peter WesleySmith & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 1988).
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the Constitution.” Such a power might even result in “a dramatic change in
the common law judicial system [of Hong Kong];” whence, “it is doubtful
whether this method of review is feasible.”86 Basic law drafter Xiao Weiyun
insisted that “the power to review whether the laws enacted by the Hong
Kong legislature were consistent with the Basic Law was vested in the
National People’s Congress Standing Committee and not in the Court of
Final Appeal.” 87 Zhang Youyu dismissed the Basic Law as a valid basis for
any judicial review whatsoever in these words: “the Basic Law is not in and
of itself a ‘constitution.’” 88
What is more, by limiting the power of the courts to “adjudication,”
the Basic Law implies that their work is confined to resolving disputes, not
invalidating statutes inconsistent with the Basic Law or judging the actions
of political officials.89 It excludes from the courts’ jurisdiction “acts of
state,” including, but not limited to, foreign affairs and national defense,
with the consequence, at least in theory, that officials can contend in court
that any act of theirs under constitutional challenge is an act of the state and
non-justiciable. 90 The Basic Law requires every appointment to the Court of
Final Appeal to be confirmed by the semi-unelected Legislative Council 91
and does not forbid the Chief Executive from vetoing a judicial nominee
even if recommended by the Independent Judicial Officers Recommendation
Commission. 92 That the Basic Law apparently empowers major political
actors of the SAR to be judges in their own cases should surprise no one
familiar with contemporary Chinese constitutional law, which affords no
legal remedy for breaches of the Chinese Constitution by the State. 93 It is a
truism that constitutional rights “do not have primacy” in China’s legal
system. The Constitution “has not become the standard for judging the
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behaviour of state organs or citizens,” 94 and the people’s courts rarely, if
ever, cite constitutional provisions in either criminal or civil judgments. 95
Nothing in the Basic Law stops itself from descending to a “nominal”
instrument which functions “partly as propaganda and partly as
camouflage,” much like the Chinese Constitution itself. 96 To make sense of
why “virtually every aspect of life in Hong Kong is affected in innumerable
ways by the Basic Law,” 97 one must look beyond the document.
IV.

THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW

A.

The Endurance of Constitutional Common Law

If the Basic Law had established any system of constitutional judicial
review, it was at best one of “weak-form review.” 98 Based on the text of the
Basic Law, the Court of Final Appeal could have easily abdicated the power
of constitutional review by holding that such a power is vested exclusively
in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and that any
legislation not vetoed by the latter must be presumed consistent with the
Basic Law and by the courts. 99 Had the Basic Law been mechanically
interpreted, no constitutional common law could have arisen. Moreover, the
SAR authorities or the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress could easily have brought the Court back into line with the latent
authoritarianism and judicial minimalism of the Basic Law by formal or
informal means ranging from amendment to court-curbing.
Yet, no end to constitutional common law is in sight. No trend toward
non-compliance by the political authorities with the Court’s jurisprudence
has been detected. 100 No jurisdiction-stripping legislation has been enacted
and no retaliatory judicial budget slashing has been reported. Indeed judicial
independence “remains solid and alive.” 101 The Standing Committee has
94
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confined its Interpretations to areas outside Hong Kong’s autonomy, 102
which, so far, “have been absorbed by the Hong Kong system of government
without difficulty.” 103 Consistent with the theoretical framework expounded
in Section II, Hong Kong’s constitutional common law has emerged out of a
polity heavily laden with escalating political transaction costs. These
favorable conditions have allowed the Court to fashion doctrines that
maximized judicial influence while raising the costs to the SAR authorities,
and by extension the Standing Committee, of counteracting that influence.
B.

A High Political Transaction-Cost Polity

In the course of more than 150 years of political isolation, Hong Kong
and its inhabitants have assumed a unique civic identity, with political
values differing radically from those of the mainland Chinese. 104 Hong
Kong residents are known for their willingness to push back against
infringements of principles they hold dear, like the rule of law, judicial
independence, and civil liberties. 105 For example, a half-million-strong
march in July 2003 stopped, with the help of a critical defection from the
ruling elite, proposed national security legislation sanctioned by Beijing but
deemed too draconian by residents. Another example of successful activism
by Hong Kong residents is the September 2012 encirclement of the
Government Secretariat by tens of thousands of demonstrators who
forestalled the introduction of compulsory primary school “moral and
national education” courses condemned by the press and civil society as
“brainwashing.” 106 A decision of the Standing Committee in August 2014,
conclusively affirming the Communist Party’s de facto right to disqualify
politically unacceptable Hong Kong residents from running for Chief
Executive, ignited the historic Umbrella Revolution in which protestors
occupied streets in three of the busiest districts for seventy-nine days
between September and December 2014 in defiance of riot police and public
order laws. 107 It is estimated that as many as 1.2 million out of a total
102
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population of 7.2 million people participated in the movement at various
times in various ways. 108
Set against this backdrop, the transaction costs to the SAR authorities
of passing legislation or proposing an amendment to the Basic Law to
overturn a Court of Final Appeal decision are exorbitant. Absent an
Interpretation of the Standing Committee, the SAR authorities will find it
practically impossible to agree to amend the Basic Law just to overturn one
decision of the Court of Final Appeal. Between 2005 and 2015, the
Legislative Council vetoed two out of three government proposals to amend
the Basic Law’s electoral rules. 109 Achieving agreement on a statutory
proposal to curb the Court is only slightly less difficult. Despite the fact that
the majority of seats in the Legislative Council are held by pro-China
parties, empirical investigations revealed that the government’s legislative
success rate, measured by the number of legislative proposals passed, during
the C.H. Tung and Donald Tsang tenures (1997–2012) stood at a low level
of only 56.05% because 40.04% of all legislative initiatives originally
scheduled were shelved or suspended by defiant parliamentarians. 110 This
lack of comity has turned the Legislative Council adversarial, superseding
the old consensual politics with open confrontation. 111 “Very damaging
divisions” further fragmented the ruling elite in the aftermath of the 2012
Chief Executive election, which pitted two pro-China candidates against
each other in a bitter election.112 The SAR’s “corporatist” 113 regime
succumbed to rampant intra-elite conflicts that eventually plunged Hong
Kong “into a political quagmire of pervasive public discontent and
distrust” 114
and reinforced external resistance to any controversial
governmental action. It was against this background of high political
transaction costs that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal fashioned an
impressive body of constitutional common law.
108
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The Core Doctrines

This subsection examines seven of the Court’s core constitutional
common law doctrines: supremacy of the Basic Law, the living constitution,
the separation of powers, legality, proportionality, the margin of
appreciation, and avoidance of judicial reference, all of which are selected
on the basis of their apparent difference from the Basic Law’s literal text.
1.

Supremacy of the Basic Law

The supremacy of a constitutional text does nothing by itself to
establish judicial supremacy over constitutional questions. 115 In principle,
the Basic Law decrees that “[n]o law enacted by the legislature of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall contravene this Law.” 116 Yet, it
provides no specific process for disposing of primary or delegated
legislation enacted after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty and
suspected of unconstitutionality, let alone mandate its judicial invalidation.
Given that non-judicial actors such as the Chief Executive and the
Legislative Council are vested with considerable constitutional authority, it
is not absurd for them to lay claim to interpretive authority on par with
courts, at least when performing their constitutional duties.117 In this regard,
the doctrine of Basic Law supremacy is the most fundamental of all
constitutional common law doctrines, without which the Court of Final
Appeal would find it impossible, most of the time, to equate its reading of
the Basic Law with the document itself.
Historically, a precept of the British Hong Kong legal system was its
doctrine of the supremacy of the Letters Patent—the constitutional document
of Hong Kong during British rule. Like parliamentary supremacy in
England, this was never codified, but evolved as a rule via judges exercising
their judgment of the political reality.118 As the Supreme Court of Hong
Kong held over one century ago, the doctrine entails that “[a]ny enactment
[that the Legislative Council] may purport to pass, which is not within the
scope of the Letters Patent is made without jurisdiction, and the Courts
would have no hesitation in pronouncing it bad.” 119 Naturally, this rule
115
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lapsed on July 1, 1997 with the abrogation of the Letters Patent as the
constitutional document of Hong Kong. The Court of Final Appeal seized
the opportunity of its first major case, Ng Ka Ling v. Director of
Immigration, 120 to convert that doctrine to one of Basic Law supremacy,
resurrecting thereby the interpretive supremacy of the judiciary over the
canonical constitutional text of the day. “As with other constitutions,” the
Court intoned, “laws which are inconsistent with the Basic Law are of no
effect and are invalid” for “the courts of the Region have independent
judicial power within the high degree of autonomy conferred on the
Region;” “[i]t is therefore for the courts of the Region to determine
questions of inconsistency and invalidity when they arise.” 121 Significantly,
the Court claimed that “[t]he exercise of this jurisdiction is a matter of
obligation, not of discretion [. . .] the courts are bound to hold that a law or
executive act is invalid at least to the extent of the inconsistency.” 122 The
Standing Committee’s subsequent override of the Ng Ka Ling decision by
way of an Interpretation was narrowly confined to that judgment’s
substantive pro-immigration aspects; it took no action to hamper the
consolidation of the doctrine of Basic Law supremacy, which in many
contexts is tantamount to judicial supremacy. Consider the following
statement of the Court in another case, more than ten years later and under
another Chief Justice: “It is important to acknowledge that while the views
of the legislature are to be considered, it is the court that has the ultimate
responsibility to determine whether legislation is constitutional,” something
which is “a matter of law, only for the courts to determine.” 123
Integral to the doctrine are credible judicial remedies for breaches of
the Basic Law, as determined by the courts. The Court of Final Appeal has
taken the lead in developing two main remedies: remedial interpretation and
declarations of invalidity. 124 Remedial interpretation, though subtler than
declarations of invalidity, is probably no less consequential, for it empowers
the Court to rescue the constitutionality of a statute “in an altered form” 125
through its own “judicial techniques such as reading down and reading
in.” 126 To justify this power, the Court simply imputed to the Legislative
Council the implied intention that it would rather “its legislative provision to
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
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have a valid, even if reduced, operation than to have no operation at all.” 127
If an impugned provision cannot be remedially interpreted in a way that is
not “fundamentally at odds with the intent of the legislation in question,” 128
it must be declared unconstitutional. 129 Though declarations of invalidity do
not literally expunge provisions from the statute books, 130 they do obligate
inferior courts to “disapply” them with both retrospective and prospective
effect in all adjudications. 131 It is thus rightly called “a course of last resort
in the fullest sense.” 132
The Court of Final Appeal has also asserted the judicial competence
to temporarily suspend remedial interpretations and declarations of
invalidity. In Koo Sze Yiu v. Chief Executive of the HKSAR, 133 the Court, in
consideration of the pragmatic value of covert surveillance “in the detection
and prevention of crime and threats to public security,” 134 suspended its
declarations against a statutory provision and an executive order. These had
authorized covert surveillance by law enforcement agencies for a grace
period of six months. The Court’s decision was to give the political
authorities time to update the legal framework in line with constitutional
guarantees of privacy and communication rights. This innovation was so
extraordinary that Sir Anthony Mason, on the Koo Sze Yiu Court, conceded
that it might raise “fundamental doctrinal questions relating to the separation
of powers, the role of the courts, the relationship between the courts and the
legislative branch of government.” 135 The Legislative Council nonetheless
complied with legislation revised with reference to the ruling.
The Court went a step further in W v. Registrar of Marriages, in
which it remedially interpreted statutory marriage provisions that had, in the
majority’s view, unconstitutionally excluded postoperative male-to-female
transsexuals from the meaning of “woman” and “female.” 136 The Court not
only suspended its orders for twelve months, but also ruled that even if
“such legislation does not eventuate,” the courts below would still be bound
to “decide questions regarding the implications of recognizing an
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
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individual’s acquired gender for marriage purposes as and when any
disputed questions arise” in accordance with its judgment. 137 Subsequently,
the Legislative Council’s failure to agree on a response before expiry of the
suspension period did not prevent the Court from granting the appellant’s
prayer for relief. 138
2.

The Living Constitution

The Basic Law gives no methodological guidance on how it should be
interpreted, and its final interpreter, the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, has never attempted to provide any, 139 despite
“considerable anxiety and debate” in Hong Kong itself. 140 Vague gestures to
“stability and prosperity” have been invoked in lieu of clear legal
propositions to justify its Interpretations. 141 Constitutional common law has
filled this gap in the Hong Kong legal system. In Ng Ka Ling, the Court
pronounced the Basic Law “a living instrument intended to meet changing
needs and circumstances” the interpretation of which required a “purposive
approach” to ascertaining its “true meaning” by reference to “the purpose of
the instrument and its relevant provisions as well as the language of its text
in the light of the context.” 142 The courts “should give a generous
interpretation” to the Basic Law’s rights provisions so as to “give to Hong
Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms so
constitutionally guaranteed.” 143 In Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung
Yuen, 144 the Court went further, opining that constitutional interpretation
must be an “objective exercise” and avoid “a literal, technical, narrow or
rigid approach” on the one hand, and respect the statutory language that has
been used on the other. 145 The task of the courts “is not to ascertain the
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intent of the lawmaker on its own,” 146 but “[o]nce the courts conclude that
the meaning of the language of the text when construed in the light of its
context and purpose is clear, the courts are bound to give effect to the clear
meaning of the language.” 147 In doing so, “[t]he courts will not on the basis
of any extrinsic materials depart from that clear meaning and give the
language a meaning which the language cannot bear.” 148 The Court took a
narrow reading of the Standing Committee’s 1999 Interpretation of the Basic
Law. The Interpretation had in passing cited an opinion of one of its own
working committees, issued six years after the enactment of the Basic Law
in 1990, as embodying the original intent of that Law. After Chong Fung
Yuen, Hong Kong judges seemed to have no obligation to follow the
Standing Committee’s arbitrary claims of “original” intent, which would
have entailed ruinous legal uncertainty as well as loss of local judicial
authority. 149
This approach is demonstrated by the W case, in which the Court was
to determine whether provisions in the Basic Law on “the freedom of
marriage of Hong Kong residents” 150 protected the right of post-operative
transsexuals to marry. When they drafted the Basic Law in the 1980s, its
framers might well have intended to guarantee only the freedom of marriage
of a person born male with a person born female, competent to procreate,
excluding transsexuals. Yet the Court by a four-to-one majority claimed
“the Basic Law (and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
as given constitutional effect by the Bill of Rights and art. 39 of the Basic
Law) are living instruments intended to meet changing needs and
circumstances.” 151 The majority continued, “[i]n present-day multi-cultural
Hong Kong where people profess many different religious faiths or none at
all . . . procreation is no longer (if it ever was) regarded as essential to
marriage.” 152 Thus, it is unjustified to consider “the ability to engage in
procreative sexual intercourse as a sine qua non premise for deducing purely
biological criteria for ascertaining a person’s sex for marriage purposes.” 153
146
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Without purporting to change the legal meaning of marriage as a union
between a male and female, the Court ruled that to deny a postoperative
transsexual woman the right to marry a man is to “deny her right to marry at
all [and to] impair the very essence of the right to marry.” 154 The Court’s
message was clear: the common law breathes life into the Basic Law,
making a “living constitution” of it, not the other way round.155 The
constitution of Hong Kong, like other common law constitutions, is one that
evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances without being
formally amended. 156
3.

The Separation of Powers

The political system of Hong Kong is often described as “executiveled,” although neither the Basic Law nor the Letters Patent ever used such a
term. 157 Indeed, when the Basic Law was drafted, Deng Xiaoping explicitly
rejected the “Western” principle of “separation of powers” as incompatible
with the “national situation” of China and the “reality” of Hong Kong. 158
Under this view, the Basic Law may be read as envisaging some kind of
constitutional collaboration between the three branches of the SAR,
requiring each to defer to the other’s institutional prerogatives when
proper. 159 By contrast, constitutional common law posits that checks and
balances between separate powers are equally important, and definitive of
the Hong Kong political system. The role of the courts, according to the
Court of Final Appeal, is to function as “a constitutional check on the
executive and legislative branches of government,” so as “to ensure that they
act in accordance with the Basic Law.” 160 The question to be asked is
“whether the approach chosen by the legislature is one permitted by the
Constitution,” something that “does not involve deference to the
legislature.” 161
The Court has said that while “the PRC [People’s Republic of China]
Constitution does not provide for a separation of powers that is the same as
or similar to the common law doctrine of the separation of powers,” 162 this
154
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does not affect Hong Kong’s identity as “a society with a strong
commitment to the rule of law and its concomitants of an independent
judiciary and respect for the separation of powers.” 163 Separation of powers
is a common law doctrine but one “which, in the case of Hong Kong, is
reinforced by the constitutional separation of powers provided for by the BL
[Basic Law].” 164 This principle is also a malleable “two-way street.” 165
However, it has been invoked by the Court to justify non-interference in
highly politicized matters. For instance, under the separation of powers,
“the courts will recognise the exclusive authority of the legislature in
managing its own internal processes in the conduct of its business [and] will
not intervene to rule on the regularity or irregularity of the internal processes
of the legislature but will leave it to determine exclusively for itself matters
of this kind.” 166
4.

The Principle of Legality

In its statutory interpretive jurisprudence, the Court of Final Appeal
has domesticated the English principle of legality, the effect of which is that
in the absence of express words or necessary implication, legislation shall
not be construed to justify infringing constitutional rights, 167 and “where
necessary, the Court will effect a remedial construction of the relevant
statutory provisions.” 168 This is a principle “meant to guard against the risk
that the full implications of general or ambiguous statutory language said to
have abrogated or curtailed fundamental rights or freedoms went unnoticed
by the legislature.” 169 It requires that any restriction of fundamental rights
must be sufficiently specific to allow the citizen to predict the legal
consequences of his conduct, and to enable public officials to know the
legitimate limits of their powers. 170 The principle of legality potentially
ramifies into the relationship between the Hong Kong system of law and the
Standing Committee. 171 Absent any formal recourse in the event the
163
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Standing Committee issues an Interpretation that threatens to infringe upon
fundamental rights, the courts may reasonably ask whether the Committee
may not have intended to annul the fundamental rights and liberties affirmed
in the Basic Law in the absence of clear language to the contrary and in
order to save the rule of law.
5.

The Principle of Proportionality

Like the principle of legality, the principle of proportionality is not
expressed in the Basic Law. But unlike the former, which concerns the
formalities by which a right may be circumscribed, the latter addresses the
balance between means adopted and legitimate aims. 172 Ever since the
British domesticated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in 1991, the courts, in cautious, incremental steps, have been
adopting the European doctrine of proportionality when arguing the demerits
of limitations to fundamental rights.173 The Court of Final Appeal,
undaunted by the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, continues to invoke
this powerful doctrine in order to review legislation, executive decisions,
and common law rules on many occasions. 174
For example, the Court has held that the Commissioner of Police must
apply the proportionality test whenever he exercises his statutory discretion
to impose limits on the right of peaceful assembly, admonishing that police
power may not be wielded arbitrarily.175 The test was spelled out in exacting
terms: “(1) the restriction must be rationally connected with one or more of
the legitimate purposes; and (2) the means used to impair the right of
peaceful assembly must be no more than is necessary to accomplish the
legitimate purpose in question.” 176 The rationale of the principle of
proportionality, the Court explained, is that the Basic Law, as “a constitution
properly protective of human rights,” requires all public powers capable of
restricting such rights to “be clearly and carefully limited to avoid the danger
of it being exercised arbitrarily or disproportionately. The rule of law so
demands.” 177 In the anti-discrimination context, the Court had ruled
172
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unconstitutional statutory provisions that solely criminalized homosexual
buggery committed in public for breaching the Basic Law’s guarantee of
legal equality: “differential treatment” cannot be justified unless there exists
some “genuine need for such difference [which must also] be rationally
connected to the legitimate aim [and] be no more than is necessary to
accomplish the legitimate aim.” 178
6.

The Margin of Appreciation

The “margin of appreciation,” a doctrine adopted from European
supranational jurisprudence, holds that courts should appreciate the
informational advantages of the government and the Legislative Council,
just as international courts do those of national governments, even if the
courts cannot be said to be unfamiliar with local conditions.179 In Fok Chun
Wa v. Hospital Authority, 180 the Court upheld an administrative policy
denying the non-resident spouses of permanent residents eligibility for
subsidized services at public hospitals. The Court explained its decision in
the following terms, “where limited public funds are involved, the courts
have recognized that lines have had to be drawn by the executive or the
legislature” which should not be disturbed unless “shown to be manifestly
without reasonable foundation.” 181
The classic statement of this doctrine, touching judicial approaches to
constitutional adjudication of civil and political rights on one hand and
social and economic rights on the other, can be found in Kong Yunming v.
Director of Social Welfare. 182 There the Court reviewed a policy, contained
in an Order in Council, excluding all non-permanent residents from
eligibility for benefits under the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance
scheme. 183 The Court distinguished between “fundamental rights” and
“socio-economic policies.” The former encompasses rights like the freedom
of expression and the presumption of innocence, any restriction of which
should be regarded as “disproportionate” unless justifiable as no more than a
“minimal impairment.” A “minimal impairment” is defined as an action that
“goes no further than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in
178
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question.” 184 By contrast, the allocation of finite public funds in a social
welfare context risks neither violation of “fundamental rights” nor
“discrimination on inherently suspect grounds.” Under the margin of
appreciation principle, courts ought to intervene only if the impugned act is
“manifestly without reasonable justification.” 185 The Court of Final Appeal
astonished many when it announced that the “right to social welfare is not a
fundamental right but a right which intrinsically involves the Government
setting rules determining eligibility and benefit levels.” 186
7.

Predominant Provision Test

The Basic Law obligates the SAR courts, when interpreting provisions
on matters not wholly within the Region’s autonomy in the course of final
adjudication, to “seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress through the Court of
Final Appeal.” 187 Interestingly, “relevant provisions” are not defined, nor is
the Standing Committee forbidden to circumscribe at will the scope of
validity of Hong Kong judicial doctrines, as embodied in the precedents of
its courts. 188 In theory, this referral procedure is a carte blanche for Beijing
to “secure the total subordination of Hong Kong to China.” 189 It was justly
called “a nightmare to the Court of Final Appeal that it cannot get rid of.” 190
If used with any frequency, it would prohibit Hong Kong’s common law
from operating as a free-standing legal system. 191
Constitutional common law has mediated the effect of the referral
procedure through the so-called “predominant provision test” formulated by
the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Ka Ling. The test divides Basic Law
provisions into two types: “non-excluded provisions” (those belonging to
the autonomous jurisdiction of the Hong Kong SAR), and “excluded
provisions” (matters for which the Chinese Central People’s Government
has responsibility or touching relations between the Central People’s
184
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Government and the SAR). The courts may refer to the Standing Committee
an “excluded provision” only if it is a “predominant provision” in the case at
bar, meaning that it “will affect the judgment on the case.” 192 Even in such a
case, a referral to the Standing Committee may be avoided if a competent
court can show that the provision is not essential for the result of its
decision.
In practice, the Court of Final Appeal avoids referring matters to the
Standing Committee with impunity. The first-ever referral was not made
until 2011—fourteen years after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty—in
the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates
LLC (No. 1). 193 That case involved the question of whether China’s policy
of granting foreign states absolute immunity in its mainland courts extended
to Hong Kong, where common law judges have traditionally applied the
English doctrine of restrictive immunity. China’s responsibility for foreign
affairs is exclusive, whereas the courts of Hong Kong are bound to defer to
Beijing’s decisions “on matters of foreign affairs relating to the People’s
Republic of China as a sovereign State.” 194 Accordingly, a majority of the
Court took the then unprecedented step of referring to the Standing
Committee for an Interpretation. The Standing Committee duly returned an
Interpretation that directly quoted each of the Court’s questions and
provided acute and affirmative answers. 195 The Court then issued its own
final judgment applying the Standing Committee’s Interpretation to the case
in favor of the Congo. 196 In delivering a detailed and principled judgment
that evaluated all relevant legal and policy issues, and in rendering its own
provisional ruling before the Standing Committee got around to an
Interpretation, the Court of Final Appeal created the impression that it
remained the real final adjudicative authority in Hong Kong de facto. Each
of the four questions referred to the Standing Committee had been narrowly
drafted to require only a binary (“yes” or “no”) answer. This strategy has
been praised as “a laudable attempt that reduces the arbitrariness of the
referencing process.” 197
192
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The “predominant provision” test stands untouched after the first and
only referral so far. Vallejos v. Commissioner of Registration 198 challenged
the constitutionality of a statute that controversially prohibited foreign
domestic helpers from acquiring permanent residency, no matter how long
they have resided in Hong Kong. This was allegedly contrary to the Basic
Law’s permission for Chinese citizens “who have ordinarily resided in Hong
Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years” to acquire
permanent residency. 199 Though affirming the status quo, the Court rejected
the Commissioner of Registration’s request for a referral to the Standing
Committee for a final interpretation of the meaning of certain parts of its
1999 Interpretation as a matter of obligation, notwithstanding the Chong
Fung Yuen principles. The Court reaffirmed that the reference mechanism is
mandatory only upon the two well-established conditions of the avoidance
doctrine, namely, “classification” and “necessity,” both of which must be
satisfied before it can proceed to a reference. 200 The Court jealously
defended its prerogative “to decide and for it alone to decide” 201 whether to
make any reference and dismissed the Commissioner’s request as
“unnecessary.” 202
The provision in question, though an “excluded
provision,” does not legally apply to foreign domestic helpers, who are
“qualitatively so far-removed from what would traditionally be recognized
as ‘ordinary residence.’” 203 Importantly, the Court formalized a third hurdle
in the doctrine by ruling that a reference request must satisfy a third
“arguability” condition, designed to eliminate “a risk of potential abuse” by
avoiding the slippery slope along which “all sorts of fanciful arguments
could then be made just to seek a reference to the Standing Committee.” 204
Thus the Court has created for itself even greater latitude in avoiding
engagement with the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress.
D.

Analysis

The importance of political transaction costs to the durability of
constitutional common law under authoritarianism cannot be overstated. It
is perhaps best illustrated, albeit negatively, by the landmark Ng Ka Ling
198
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saga. Public opinion appeared to be on the government’s side 205 after it
alleged that the Court’s pro-immigrant ruling would cause an estimated
1.675 million more immigrants from mainland China to flood into Hong
Kong, precipitating a severe social and economic crisis. 206 On June 26,
1999, upon a constitutionally dubious petition from the Chief Executive
through the State Council, the Standing Committee duly delivered its
Interpretation, which reinstated the anti-immigrant provisions invalidated by
the Court. Fortunately for the Court, the alliance of popular opinion, the
SAR authorities, and the Standing Committee proved to be short-lived. By
the same token, the almost complete absence of constitutional adjudication
throughout much of the British era can be attributed to extremely low levels
of political transaction costs, as elite cohesion was high and systemic
popular resistance was non-existent. 207
The stable evolution of constitutional common law in Hong Kong
after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty can moreover be explained by
the benefits of its constitutive doctrines to the authorities and the citizenry.
The doctrine of Basic Law supremacy has rendered that document—
notwithstanding its undemocratic origin and authoritarian tenor—an
authoritative, respectable, credible “constitutional instrument of binding
force.” 208 The reality is that the Basic Law is Hong Kong’s constitution
because “the courts and others treat it so.”209 Credible judicial remedies,
upheld by the separation of powers principle, have convinced aggrieved
citizens that they will lessen their costs by seeking legal remedies under the
Basic Law rather than by acting extra-constitutionally, even if power-holders
do oftentimes get affirmed. The living constitution doctrine enables the
courts to adapt the Basic Law enacted more than a quarter of a century ago
to present conditions, at low cost to the polity, in light of shifting social
attitudes, the demands of rapid technological change, and other modern
challenges. 210 It has spared public officials not only the cost of formally
amending the Basic Law for the foregoing considerations, but also the
burden of interpreting it themselves simply to remove the uncertainty
proceeding from the ambiguity of incompleteness inherent in all
205
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constitutions and owing to the inevitable informational and organizational
limitations of its drafters. 211
Standards of constitutionally appropriate behavior, like proportionality
and legality, benefit the whole political system by confirming the legitimacy
of policies and statutes that the courts maintain or forbear to nullify through
constitutional review. 212 Proportionality in particular tests arbitrariness by
obliging officials and lawmakers to duly weigh the pros and cons of their
acts, consistent with the percepts of cost-benefit analysis. 213 Improved
legislative and administrative rationality in turn promotes market rationality,
eases pressures on elites to reform the political system, and offers aggrieved
citizens a sense of vindication. 214 The opportunity costs to the SAR
authorities of voiding the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence would be
high, as acknowledged by the Secretary for Justice, the third most senior
principal official of the SAR, who in 2008 stated that “[a]lthough defeats in
judicial reviews can be hard to swallow immediately,” there is a widespread
conviction within the government, that “the commitment to the high
standards of legality, reasonableness and fairness, and the metamorphosis
brought about by judicial discipline at times, will improve public
administration, and will make Hong Kong a better society.” 215
Additionally, the Court of Final Appeal’s standard interpretations of
the Basic Law, disseminated by the media, help clarify the citizenry’s
understanding of what is a constitutional violation, raise the costs of
oppression, and serve as a resource civil society can use to rally support for
worthy causes. For example, the Court’s generous interpretation and
enforcement of the individual rights under the Basic Law has provided
useful information for interested parties and non-state actors like the
Catholic Church, academics, human rights advocacy groups, radio
personalities, and opposition politicians to coordinate resistance to
transgressions by political authority.216 Kemal Bokhary, a long-time judge
of the Court, went so far as to suggest that the “people’s assertiveness [is]
211
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the mainstay of [Hong Kong’s] legal system,” 217 and that “imperiling
judicial independence would be more harmful [in Hong Kong] than in a
fully developed democracy [. . . .] In so far as a shortfall in democracy
increases the burden on the courts, we accept that increased burden.” 218 The
Court’s principled avoidance of making reference of constitutional questions
to the Standing Committee has won considerable respect from the public. 219
Since Ng Ka Ling, the Court has shown more self-awareness that its
constitutional jurisprudence must be moderated by “a keen understanding”
of political consequences, 220 and that sustainable judicial interpretations
accommodate the preferences and sensitivities of major political
stakeholders, even when transaction costs prohibit political retaliation. The
Court has sensibly implemented doctrines that signal to the authorities its
awareness of the political boundaries of its assertions of constitutional
jurisdiction. The separation of powers doctrine is a double-edged sword the
Court can aim at itself when a respectable pretext is needed to acquiesce to
the boundaries of the government and the Legislative Council. The margin
of appreciation has “hardwired” both judicial deference and hard-headed
principles of law and economics into Hong Kong’s constitutional common
law, 221 in a way that is consistent with the Basic Law’s neoliberal spirit. 222
V.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional common law that has sprung from the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal in the face of lasting authoritarianism is unique. The
doctrine of Basic Law supremacy has staked out for the judiciary a real
primacy over constitutional meaning and enforcement in a way only implicit
in its text. The living constitution doctrine has freed the Court from the
chains of real or alleged original intent so that it can confidently construe
constitutional provisions in line with the common law tradition and in light
of societal and technological metamorphosis. The separation of powers has
legitimized the Court’s checks and balances on the political branches. The
217
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principles of legality and proportionality have imposed important limits on
arbitrary government decision making, prescribing effective standards of
constitutionally permissible legislative conduct. The margin of appreciation
has lent the Court discretion to adopt a hands-off approach to resourceallocation without abdicating a judicial role in social and economic rights.
Judicial reference avoidance has averted interference by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress in Basic Law interpretation, at
least in relation to adjudication.
For all practical purposes, it has been the constitutional common law
of the Court of Final Appeal, which underpins and transcends all instances
of constitutional litigation in Hong Kong, not the text of the Basic Law, that
has shaped the meaning and meaningfulness of the Basic Law in the minds
of millions of residents of the SAR, making it a morally–not just legally–
binding document. How did this come to pass? This article has theorized
the plenitude of political transaction costs: internal regime fragmentation
and state-society discord in Hong Kong since the resumption of Chinese
sovereignty that crucially created conditions favorable for the impunity of an
independent judiciary and constitutional common law in the shadow of an
authoritarian sovereign. To survive such odds, judicial interpretations must
yield important benefits that win support or coax acquiescence from the
regime and the citizenry alike. Constitutional common law, nowadays
miraculously an unquestioned feature of Hong Kong’s landscape, is hardly a
natural outcome of the Basic Law. An alternative set of political conditions
with negligible political transaction costs may have produced very different
and very sinister results.
What might the future hold for Hong Kong’s constitution under
Chinese sovereignty? High transaction-cost politics is unlikely to fade. The
diametrically opposed views of Beijing and the pan-democratic forces on the
selection of the Chief Executive almost certainly guarantee protracted
constitutional conflict. 223 The Umbrella Revolution hints that Beijing will
no longer offer any concessions toward electoral competition in Hong Kong,
even in face of unprecedented popular mobilization. 224 Corporatist rule will
not wither away in the foreseeable future; the Chief Executive is heavily
dependent on Legislative Council support for passing bills, and loyalist
parliamentarians have yet to canvass majority support from the electorate at
223
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large. 225 The future of constitutional common law remains cautiously
optimistic if the Court will adhere to its strategy of raising the costs of courtcurbing and if the polity will persist in fragmentation.
Potentially dangerous undercurrents nonetheless must not be ignored.
The incumbent Chief Executive has not only adopted relatively hostile
rhetoric towards the judiciary, 226 but also taken steps to combat political
infighting by replacing the traditional professional elites with his own active
supporters in the Executive Council and important agencies. 227 Besides,
democratic electoral reform is one area in which the Court of Final Appeal
must ideally avoid. Any substantive interpretation of the Basic Law’s
electoral reform provisions must deeply unsettle either rulers or the ruled,
causing them to withdraw their acquiescence in or support from the Court
regardless of transaction costs, an outcome that is sure to weaken the
political foundations of constitutional common law, to devastating effect.228
In the aftermath of the deeply polarizing Umbrella Revolution, however, it is
uncertain how long the Court can stay aloof from democratization
controversies.
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